
March 24, 2025
Specter,
Your first real test is here, and I expect you to execute with precision, not bravado.
Speed is for amateurs.
Control, patience and a keen sense for digital rot are the weapons of a professional.
Your target: a small manufacturer.
Unremarkable at first glance, yet they hold the keys to something much larger.
Their systems are fragile, their security outdated.
They are an entry point, not just a prize.
You may ask, why not go after the corporate giants?
Because multinationals have layers of defense, dedicated response teams and security budgets bigger than some nations.
But the smaller firms?
They are the neglected gateways, the overlooked cracks in an empire’s foundation.
We do not attack fortresses – we compromise the locksmiths who build their doors.
Step one: Exploit their false sense of security
Small manufacturers do not believe they are targets.
They think cyber warfare is reserved for banks and defense contractors, not for factories that make components for supply chains.
That illusion makes them vulnerable.
Their IT departments (if they even exist) are overstretched, their budgets laughable and their approach to security is more superstition than strategy.
Step two: The human factor (always the weakest link)
Forget brute force attacks – human error is our true access key.
A well-crafted email disguised as a supplier inquiry, a LinkedIn message promising a lucrative deal or a simple invoice attachment laced with malware – these are the tools of a refined operator.
They do not question – they click.
They do not verify – they trust.
Even better, their systems are relics.
Legacy industrial software, unsecured remote access points, outdated firmware – it is a playground for those who know where to look.
Windows XP, open RDP ports, factory machines running admin/admin credentials.
They think physical security means digital security – they are wrong.
Step three: The supply chain leverage
The true value of these companies is not their balance sheet but their connections.
They trade CAD files, production specs and supply schedules with household names.
Breach one, and you have a golden ticket into a wider network.
A ransomware attack on their ERP system can ripple through an entire industry.
The larger players will not hesitate to intervene, making negotiation swift and profitable.
Step four: Choose your strategy wisely
Once inside, subtlety is key.
A smash-and-grab ransomware attack works, but a prolonged exfiltration of intellectual property is often more valuable.
Supply chain data, proprietary designs, confidential contracts – these are worth far more than a one-time payout.
If resistance is met, locking down CNC controllers or cutting access to operational databases will expedite their cooperation.
Most of these firms do not have a dedicated security team.
They rely on generic antivirus software and lack the expertise to counter a strategic incursion.
The longer they hesitate, the deeper our foothold becomes.
Final advice: Do not underestimate them
Arrogance is the downfall of many in this trade.
Some manufacturers are becoming aware of their weaknesses.
A few have adopted multi-factor authentication, isolated critical systems and even begun regular security audits.
If you encounter resistance, disengage.
The best operations leave no traces, no alarms, no suspicions – only silence until it is too late.
The rest?
Well, you already know how that ends.
Now, Specter, execute with precision.
Their outdated infrastructure and blind trust are invitations, not obstacles.
The question is, will someone step in before we do?
Do not waste the opportunity.
– Koschei
Koschei,
I must admit, this assignment is not unfolding as expected.
The small manufacturer you pointed me to, at first glance, a prime target, has proven unexpectedly resilient.
Their budget is meager, their IT team small and yet, every move I’ve made has been blocked before I could take advantage.
I began, as instructed, with phishing.
My crafted supplier emails, laden with well-placed links, were met with skepticism.
Instead of clicking blindly, they verified every detail – cross-checking domain names, confirming legitimacy through secondary channels and even calling the supposed sender.
The procurement manager flagged the attempt internally, forwarding it to an IT contact, who immediately blacklisted the domain.
A small firm with security awareness?
I did not anticipate this.
Moving on, I attempted credential stuffing.
And yet, unique passwords across systems.
Multi-factor authentication.
Even their older machines were segmented, keeping critical data behind firewalls that did not fold under basic probes.
They were prepared, Koschei.
I escalated.
USB drops near their facility – nothing.
Not a single attempt to use the device.
Their employees are trained, disciplined and skeptical of anything unusual.
In desperation, I sought out their supply chain vulnerabilities.
Yet even here, I found difficulty.
Their vendors follow similar security practices, encrypting files and requiring multi-factor authentication for remote access.
No unsecured connections.
No exposed data dumps.
The cracks I relied upon simply do not exist in their foundation.
Koschei, I do not know how to proceed.
This is not the industry I thought I was preying upon.
They have adapted.
What do you advise?
– Specter
Koschei’s final letter: Failure and consequence
Specter,
Your failure is complete, and your excuses are tiresome.
You were bested not by technology alone but by discipline, awareness and a culture of vigilance.
You assumed, as I once did, that small businesses are lax, blind to their weaknesses.
But a new breed has emerged, one that understands their place in a digital battlefield.
They may not have wealth, but they wield knowledge.
They may lack large IT teams, but they have trained every employee as a line of defense.
You were not fighting a manufacturer – you were fighting a collective of individuals who refused to be weak points.
Understand this: we rely on human error, on laziness, on gaps in attention.
When those fail us, we fail entirely.
This was not a failure of opportunity.
It was a failure of assumption.
You expected easy prey and found something stronger.
Do you see now?
The ones who prepare, who question, who harden their doors – they are beyond our reach.
Your miscalculation is a lesson, and I expect you to learn from it.
Or perhaps, Specter, you are simply unfit for this work?
Do not disappoint me again.
– Koschei